A procura de um modelo de democracia camaronês ou a procura da dominação do partido-Estado
Since the 1960s, when most African countries got their independence from the colonial masters, there has been, in Africa, a search for democratic solutions.
Here and there, many paths were opened, although in general, new African leaders embarked on a path which has been called "African democracy". Cameroon, being an African country, also embarked on a path which seemed to be peculiar.
That peculiarity of Cameroon emerged during the 1990s when Africa was swept by what Samuel Huntington called democracy s third wave . In order to beter appraise what seems to be the Cameroonian exception, the analysis of this case should be carried out in comparison with those of Benin and Niger. This study is not the irst as far as democracy in Cameroon is concerned nor is it the irst comparative study on democracy and democratization in Africa. Victor Julius Ngoh is a paceseter in this respect. Studying the case of Cameroon, he arrived at the conclusion that Africans are responsible for the failure or the success of the democratisation process in their countries. Whereas he studied Cameroon from 1960 to 2000, this paper will extend this chronology to 2006 while taking 1966
as a starting point when the one-party system was established in the country.
In 2006, the parliament voted a law laying the foundations for the creation of an independent electoral body known as Elections Cameroon (ELECAM). EboussiBoulaga (1997) who studied the process of democratisation in Cameroon in the s, analysed the various structures put in place and identiied various shortcomings. Zacharie Ngniman (1993) presented the main events of the democratisation process which Cameroon went through as from 1989. This journalistic account looked at the real implications of the decisions taken at one moment or another in framing the Cameroonian path to democracy. All these studies have a weak point which resides in the absence of comparisons with other countries which enable a beter understanding of Cameroonian case. This shortcoming is avoided by Mario Azevedo who put Gabon and Cameroon side by side in an efort to show how ethnicity inluenced democracy in both countries. In comparative studies, Mamoudou Gazibo (2000 Gazibo ( , 2002 Gazibo ( , 2005 ) made a considerable contribution as he has studied the trajectories followed by Benin and Niger in the democratisation process. Moreover, he called on researchers in the ield of political science which allows other disciplines such as history to pay atention to some shortcomings in the comparative methodology. He states for instance that, in a transnational comparison, the researcher is generally more familiar with one case than the other (Gazibo, 2002, p. 441) . Moreover, he may have assembled more data for one case than for the other. As a consequence, he might be tempted to bridge the deicit of familiarity or of data by allowing himself to be guided by the case for which he has a beter grounding. There is a danger therefore of arriving at conclusions on the more 'distant' case by the observations drawn from the case the author is most familiar with. The author of this paper is more familiar with the case of Cameroon for which he has gathered suicient data. In order not to be caught in the trap of the shortcoming presented by Gazibo, the comparison will be limited to speciic aspects which Cameroon on the one hand and "enin and
Niger on the other shared notably in terms of the paths taken with regard to the creation of new institutions. The comparison will primarily focus on the period ater during which these countries engaged in processes of democratisation.
This paper aims to show that, throughout, the democracy Cameroon has been trying to build since independence has been a search for the domination of the ''. So, in order to beter present the point, the discussion will begin with the notion of democracy, and thereater, the study will present the irst phase of the search for a Cameroonian model of democracy.
In comparison with what happened in
Benin and Niger, this search resulted in the institution of a 'one-party democracy' which, in Cameroon, was the 'ruling democracy'. The second phase of the search presents the 'advanced democracy' in which the ruling party's intention is to prevail by all possible means.
Africa and the universality of democracy
In a famous interview, former French President, Jacques Chirac, had this to say: "democracy is luxury for Africa 1 Ouatara, . "lthough that was a political declaration, the opinion expressed by Mr Chirac fueled the controversy on the universality of democracy. In principle, democracy is a universal value, but its characteristics are not universal since the interpretation of the concept is not universal. It is in this framework that one can talk of American democracy, African democracy, Cameroonian democracy. This author does not mean that democracy is a stranger to Africa in general and to Cameroon in particular. On the contrary, democracy existed in traditional Africa as one former Premier of West Cameroon, Augustine Ngom Jua, asserted in 1967 (Ngoh, 2001, p. 9) . He expressed himself as follows: "the concept of total democracy has its roots in the Cameroonian traditional culture where government has for centuries been the concern of all the people, by all the people and for all the people." In this light, when Carlos Lopes talks of "the africanisation of democracy" he does not mean that there is no democracy in "frica. Rather he airms that "fricans should appropriate the debate on democracy since there is nothing speciically "frican in the politics of Africa" (Lopes, 1996, p. 142 ). The argument is also supported cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de • , -by Robert-Charles Dimi (1999) when he discusses the conversion to democracy, that is, abandoning the monolithic policy that Africa adopted for decades and collided with the principles of democracy. These authors made a point of calling upon "fricans who had expressed a diferent concept of democracy. That is why democracy has come to be prefaced. Nasser talked of "party-less democracy" (Wanyande, 2000, p. 110) . It is in this line of prefacing democracy that a path was searched for in Cameroon, with some peculiar stages.
The irst phase of the search for the Cameroonian model of democracy or the building of the 'ruling democracy'
The irst phase of the search for a Cameroonian model of democracy began with independence. Ahmadou Ahidjo was the main architect of the scheme, and had a hidden agenda which was to establish the one party system in Cameroon.
That system was the foundation of his so called 'ruling democracy' that Paul Biya reinforced from 1983 onwards.
The political system in Cameroon before independence and reuniication
It is an overstatement to talk of a Cameroonian political system before independence, since Cameroon was under colonial rule. What we had was the political system put in place by the colonial masters. Cameroon had the French and the "ritish as colonial masters. Their political systems difer in some aspects, but in general, ater the Second World War, they were characterised by the existence of multiparty politics.
Multiparty politics in Cameroon under French rule
During the last decades of French rule, Cameroonians started taking an active part in the running of their afairs as from with the institution of the Assemblée représentative du Cameroun (ARCAM . The later was the result of the implementation of the French 1946 constitution which created the French Union.
Two years later, the truly Cameroonian political party was created, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC . It resulted from several changes that afected the Jeunesse Camerounaise Française (Jeucafra) and the Rassemblement Camerounais (RACAM) (Joseph, 1986, pp.102-105 (Ngoh, 1990, pp. 22-23; Ebune, 1992, p. 126 In a nutshell, the crisis stemmed from the leadership clash that shook the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) (Ngoh 1990, pp. 95-103;  cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de • , - Ebune, 1992, pp. 138-141 (Ngoh, 1990, p. 105) . The creation of this political party introduced multiparty politics in Southern Cameroon, as political diferences led to the split of existing and the creation of new political parties. By 1961, when the plebiscite for reuniication was held, Southern Cameroon had many political parties amongst which the most important were, besides those mentioned above: the One Kamerun (OK), the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) and the Cameroons Peoples' National Convention (CPNC). These political parties competed for seats and positions as Southern Cameroon was granted a quasi-regional status in 1954 and a regional status in 1959. In the process, alternation occurred until reuniication changed the political scene.
The liquidation of the multiparty politics as a means of achieving 'ruling democracy'
The end of the multiparty politics was led by Ahmadou Ahidjo who masterminded the whole process in accordance with a hidden agenda that clearly emerges here. According to the political bureau of the Cameroon National Union (CNU), in the course of his political career, Ahmadou Ahidjo never hesitated to destroy what he had patiently put in place when the general interest was at stake (Bureau politique de l'UNC, 1968, p. 14). It is in this spirit that, in 1956, he dissolved the regional association he himself headed, i.e. the Association Amicale de la Bénoué, to form the Evolution politique du Nord Cameroun by means of which he regrouped parliamentarians of Northern Cameroon. That proved to be a prelude to the creation of a political party for Northern Cameroon. In 1957, Ahmadou Ahidjo was elected to the Legislative Assembly, and became a member of the irst French Cameroon Cabinet of May occupying the post of Minister of
Interior. He was one of the key actors of the cabinet crisis that led to the collapse of the Mbida Cabinet, only to become the new Premier. Being Prime Minister without a political party base, Ahidjo understood that he had no backing and urgently needed one. He had observed that, in Northern Cameroon, each region had a major regional association; thus, if these associations could be grouped under one umbrella, a political party, Northern Cameroon would have a stronger voice, and he, the Premier, would enjoy a stronger power base. He embarked on the task of convincing leaders of regional associations. The task was not an easy one as resistance was raised in some quarters. He inally succeeded in convincing them. As a result, in April 1958, they all assembled in Garoua and the result was the creation of the political party, the Union Camerounaise (UC) (Bayart, 1978, p. 52) , which provided Ahidjo with a new instrument at his disposal in order to achieve his goals. In assuming the premiership, he learnt, from the various parliamentary sessions, that his oice was precarious in the parliamentary system that operated cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de
• , -in Cameroon since the advent of the autonomy regime. In October 1959, the parliament voted the law granting full powers to the Premier. So, when French
Cameroon acceded to independence in 1960, the Premier enjoyed full powers without a parliament, given that the ALCAM was dissolved before independence.
Ahidjo used the full powers he enjoyed to mastermind the constitutional referendum of February 21, 1960 which changed the political system of Cameroon from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential one. The new constitution established in article that the irst President would be elected by an Electoral College comprising parliamentarians and notables (Gaillard, 1994, p. 111; Bouopda, 2006, p. (Kpwang, 1997, pp. 300-303) . During the meeting, he called on his fellow members to join the Union Camerounaise. So, by will or by force, Cameroonians were to heed to the Maroua 1960 call for the building of the great national party which would be the single party. True to this logic, the UPC members were forced to join the Union Camerounaise as in 1962 their congress was brutally dispersed by the police under the pretext that the party "had publicly bailed out the rebellion Etangondop, , p. "ouopda, , pp. Cameroon was not the only African country that engaged in the single-party political system, given that it was a notable trend in "frica ater independence.
160-161
Virtually all African states established the one party system using the arguments presented by Peter Wanyande (2000, pp. 108-109 (Grémah, 1999; Raynaut & Abba, 1990, p. 16 (Magnusson, 1996, p. 33) . Like in Niger, this political system was embedded in the constitutions put in place by Maga and Kérékou respectively. Therein lies the diference with the system in Cameroon given that the estab- The political parties and groups play a part in the expression of the sufrage. They shall be free to form and to carry on their activities within the limits established by law and regulations.
They must respect the principles of democracy and national sovereignty (Enonchong, 1967, p. 255 ).
This option seemed not to contradict the will of Ahmadou Ahidjo who was a militant of democracy but his own democracy, that is the 'ruling democracy' he wanted for Cameroon. The argument for this brand of democracy does not difer from the ideas that were put forward elsewhere in "frica in order to jus- In second place, it allows the executive to play its full role as the driving force for national development in conformity with the national constitution which provides for both the separation and the collaboration of powers in a spirit of complementarity, as required of the whole civil service by its adhesion to one single party.
It is in consideration of the later point that we have described our political system as a 'ruling democracy', in contrast to the regimes where the executive is constantly paralysed by rits of popular opion [sic opinions] power struggles and conlicts of individual interests Cameroon National Union, , pp. -.
In the system of 'ruling democracy' there is no competition, but a single party The 'advanced democracy' is summed up as a democracy of the domination of the former .
The advent of multiparty democracy in Africa
In the 1980s, Africa was stricken by a severe economic crisis which resulted in the bankruptcy of nearly all the countries of the continent, which as a result had to resort to the "reton Woods institutions. The general remedy prepared for bankrupt African countries is the implementation of a structural adjustment plan. The acceptance of this structural adjustment plan is a condition any bilateral inancial assistance. This adjustment plan is composed of harsh economic measures which can produce tensions and popular dissatisfaction. Facing this complex situation, "frican leaders were called upon to advance with puting in place democratic institutions before aspiring for inancial support. That is what François Miterrand stated in his opening speech during the France "frica summit that took place in La Baule in June 1990. He said that France would continue to help African countries but that assistance would be "half-hearted" for countries with authoritarian regimes and would be "wholehearted" for countries that would, with courage, embark on democratisation (Hugues, 2007) .
The advent of multiparty democracy in Benin and Niger "enin was the irst "frican country to be swept by democracy s third wave .
It is in this country that the maiden sovereign national conference was organised as from February 19, 1990 . Robert Dossou (2000 has given a good account of the preparation, the sessions and the result of the Beninese national conference that ended on February ,
. From this account, one learns many things. The irst is that, facing a diicult situation, the "eninese leaders decided to meet and initiate a dialogue before inding adequate solutions. Hence, the national conference framed the trajectory for democratisation. This forum set up new institutions which were transitory: the President was stripped of some of his former powers that went to the transitional Premier and the former National Assembly was replaced by the Haut Conseil de la République, the members of which were elected by the national conference. The transition period was to last one year, from March 1, 1990 to March 1, 1991. During this period, the transitional institutions were to implement the decisions taken by the national conference, notably the drating of the constitution by the commitee appointed by the conference, the organisation of the constitutional referendum and the holding of various elections. On April 1, 1991, the new date set for the end of the transitional period as provided by the new constitution of December 1990, the process had been completed. The new seting in "enin was the result of a confabulation and not the decision of an individual. The new institutions have worked well, experiencing political alternation, which is a fundamental principle of democracy. There have been some improvements, notably the creation, in 1995, of an independent body for the organisation of elections. That novelty came about as a result of the dialogue and consensus which forms the corner stone of the new political seting in "enin. The
Beninese experience has been depicted as a success story, which is why it has been imitated in some African countries like Chad, Gabon, Congo and Niger.
The President of Niger acknowledged its success and praised the Beninese for that undertaking in one of the opening speeches of the conference that took place In Niger, the sovereign national conference opened on July 29, 1991 and lasted for ninety eight days. It should be recalled that, when the citizens of that country started their claim for democratisation, the ruling opposed to change. The irst step in the resistance was the appointment of Mahamadou Halilou as the mediator whose duty was to improve relations between the state on the one hand and the trade unions and students on the other (Salifou, 2000) . The second step of the party's resistance resided in the move of the Head of State to alone decide on the advent of multiparty politics in Niger. "s a mater of fact, facing mounting pressure, Ali Saïbou, on November 15, 1990, announced, during a meeting of what was then the steering commitee of the single party, that he had opted for multiparty politics. On December 4, 1990, he added that nascent political parties could apply for temporary authorization before the revision of the constitution enabling their legalization. These delaying tactics did not satisfy the demands of the protesters who intensiied their actions that inally compelled the rulers in Niger to comply with the demand for the convening of a national conference. As in Benin, the national conference of Niger drew up a balance of the past while proposing new perspectives for the country's future. Transitional institutions were set up for 15 months, including the Head of State whose powers were reduced in favour of the transitional Prime Minister appointed by the conference, Chefou
Amadou. A transitional parliament was established called the Haut Conseil de la
République. The national conference adopted a charter for political parties and appointed a commitee for the drating of the new constitution. The experience of Niger, mutatis mutandis, is also considered to be a success story. This may sound like an overstatement given that one can ask the question as to why the process was interrupted by military coups. Of course Niger witnessed two coups, one of which was a bloody one. As the arguments put forward by Mamoudou Gazibo that became the state party. Apparently, the new party and its leaders had a foresight as to the advent of multiparty politics and anticipated measures in order to resist it. The irst measure came into force in during the renewal of the basic institutions of the ruling party that witnessed a plurality of candidates' lists (Sindjoun, 1997, p. 97) . In 1987, for the town council elections, the experience was renewed, and likewise in 1988 for the parliamentary elections. It is worth mentioning here that the experience began in November 1983. The electoral law governing the presidential election was amended, giving room for a plurality of candidates indeed, the context called for such a move ater the aborted coup, Biya was in search of legitimacy. In the CNU, only the party could put a candidate up for election, but as the chairman of the party, he was not prepared to allow the candidacies of challengers. For the parliamentary and town council elections, the competition was within the single party. This overture was in fact a smoke screen aimed at showing that the political process was actually democratic in the country. It was an anticipated resistance to the advent of the multiparty system in Cameroon. The argument was used in when the irst atempts for the creation of new political parties were made.
In the irst quarter of , Yondo Mandengué "lack, "lbert Mukong, "nicet Ekanet and others were arrested in Douala, allegedly for having held illegal meetings and for having distributed tracts hostile to the Head of State and calling for violence (Ngniman, 1993, p. 46; Sindjoun, 1999, p. 86) . However, the real reasons given for the arrest were that the arrested persons wanted to form a political party. The move was illegal as there was a de facto single party system in Cameroon.
These Cameroonians were tried before the military court so as to give credit to the oicial version of their arrest, and were sentenced to minor imprisonment terms.
The show of force was designed to dissuade anybody to embark upon a move towards creating a political party and to challenge the state party with a view to bring about a multiparty system in Cameroon. And in order to drive home the message, marches were organized by the one-party-state in the main cities of the country to protest against multiparty system and in support of the single party system. " mass to that efect was also celebrated in the Yaoundé cathedral 
From resistance to the 'advanced democracy'
"lthough the single state party inally yielded to pressures coming from within and from society at large and accepted the multiparty democracy, it tailored that democracy to suit the will of the rulers in the following terms: as multiparty politics has been forced upon the country, the new system should be that of the domination of the ruling party. This domination would be carried out through adapted laws and bodies. "ter the La "aule summit, the irst ordinary congress of the CPDM opened in Yaoundé on June 28, 1990. During the congress, the chairman of the party asked his fellow comrades to prepare for "possible competition". The words used portrayed some hesitation which was another sign of resistance, without giving any assurance to the path to be followed. Reducing it to a possibility meant that, in the mind of the chairman of the CPDM, who doubled as Head of State, there was still hope that the advent of multiparty system in Cameroon could be pre-empted. Eventually, that was not the case and in December 1990, the single state party passed several laws, notably the law governing political parties. It is on the basis of this law that the irst political parties were legalized in February . Most of the political parties newly born claimed to be opposition parties. They immediately organized into a coalition of opposition parties and called for the convening of a sovereign national conference in order to assess the general state of the nation and deine major political, economic, social and cultural guidelines for the future. In reality, knowing what had been the outcome of the national conference in Benin, they nursed the idea of obtaining a share of political power. The ruling CPDM also knew what had happened in that country and was not willing to share power or to have a Head of State stripped of some of his powers. Moreover, in the 'advanced democracy' the CPDM regime had started puting in place, the state party was to single-handedly decide everything. There was no room for dialogue and consensus.
The opposition mounted pressure on the government by organizing a country-wide civil disobedience campaign and Ghost Towns operations which were marked by acts of violence and vandalism (Mbu, 1993, pp. 44-81; Ngniman, 1993, pp. 88-95) . In reaction, the government took tough measures such as the creation of operational commands in the provinces that had heeded the opposition call.
The country recorded many casualties as a result of the interventions of these operational commands. In the meantime, the economy was in decline and state authority weakened in the process. In order to avoid a downward spiral and stand irm, the ruling CPDM government conjured a trick to wrong foot the opposition. Instead of convening a national conference, Paul Biya convened a tripartite conference with the government, political parties and neutral personalities.
Eboussi-Boulaga observed (1997, pp. 94-95 ) that most of the so called independent personalities were members of the ruling CPDM who were in cahoots with the representatives of the government. As a result, the forum that took place from October 30 to November 15, 1991 was dominated by the former state party. Its two-item agenda was to put in place mixed commitees in charge of drating the electoral law and a project governing the access of political parties to public media. From the composition of the forum which was presided over by the then Premier Sadou Hayatou, nothing revolutionary could be expected. The ruse was successful as, at the end of the tripartite conference, the Yaoundé Declaration was signed by participants and the representatives of 40 of the 47 legalized political parties Ngniman, , pp. -. The government lited the ban on public meetings and demonstrations as well as dissolving the operational commands.
The political parties, especially the opposition, agreed to withdraw the call for civil disobedience and to respect the laws and regulations regarding their activities. The signatories of the Yaoundé Declaration also agreed to put in place a tripartite technical commitee in order to drat proposals relating to constitutional reform. As the political tension was eased in the country, the government could go ahead with its agenda, including one important item which was the holding of parliamentary elections. A law was needed to govern the elections and it was incumbent on the CPDM parliament to pass that law and other proposals, notably the law governing presidential elections.
Legislating in favour of the former state party
The last session of the single state party parliament which was held in 1991, proved to be of great importance with regard to Cameroon's future political landscape. It was supposed to lay the foundations for the 'advanced democracy' envisaged by the single party government.
The irst drat bill voted upon was the one governing the election of parliamentarians. During the debate, the idea of enfranchising Cameroonians from nineteen years of age old was put forward and portrayed as the general opinion and call from the nation. The idea was rejected and the age of twenty was proposed as a threshold in the drat bill. In justifying their choice, the parliamentarians argued that the recent experience had shown that youths were not very responsible persons since they were at the forefront of civil disobedience and violence.
cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de
The truth is that parliament feared the sanction of the youth vote. given to this carving up of divisions is that it was a way of approximating rulers and ruled. In order to reinforce this argument, it was said that even the bastions of the CPDM had been 'carved out'. The true story is that the regime wanted to create favourable conditions for the ruling party. The law governing parliamentary elections established in articles 5 and 6 that elections were to be carried out according to the ballot lists; the list that obtained the absolute majority wins all the constituency seats. In case the winning list had a relative majority, half the seats were allocated to it, while the rest of seats were to be distributed proportionally to the other lists. The special constituencies were created on the basis of the results the CPDM obtained in past elections. It was expected that the trend would be similar so that the ruling party would have a majority of the seats in the new divisions. The argument of bringing the administration closer to the ruled can therefore be easily be rejected ater all the carving out of novel constituencies in CPDM bastions was a means of healing wounds provoked by the recent renewal of basic organs of the ruling party. The new town councils had been created with the same intentions.
For the town council elections, new councils were created on April 22, 2007, two days ater the convening of the electorate, a move which amounted to glaring foul play, given that this should normally be done before the calling of elections. It was not the irst time that the regime used these foul tricks in favour of the ruling party. In 1997, the town council elections were won in Bamenda, Limbe, Kumba Bafoussam and Garoua by the opposition; subsequently, the Head of State appointed CPDM oicials at the helm of these councils, thereby transforming the likely defeat of his party into a victory (Ngoh, 2001, p. 34 ).
In the 1992 snap parliamentary elections, the CPDM failed to win the absolute majority of the 180 seats which would have enabled it to rule without allies.
An alliance was concluded with the Mouvement Démocratique pour la Défense de la République (MDR), and was later extended to the UPC and the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP). In the alliance, the three political parties contributed to legislating in favour of the former state party, but in the process, they also defended their own interests. An illustration can be given with the September 1992 extraordinary session of the parliament convened in order to vote the law governing presidential election. The drat bill submited provided for a one round, single candidate ballot. Moreover, the president, who enjoyed a ive year term, was re-eligible and the candidates should have resided in Cameroon for the three years preceding the election Ngniman, , p. . The inal bill voted by the parliament changed the residency clause, and was the outcome of negotiations with the NUDP that was up for a two round election. Since its chairman, Bello Bouba Maigari intended to be his party's candidate and had resided in Cameroon only for the past thirteen months, the drat disqualiied him. So, the deal with CPDM stated that the residency clause be reduced from three years to one year and that the one round ballot system should be maintained (Sindjoun, 1997, p. 100) . The same bill provided that a candidate could not be invested by more than one party. This clause was aimed at preventing a unique opposition candidate and therefore worked in favour of the ruling CPDM. In the snap presidential election that took place on October 1992, Biya won with 39.97% as against . % for Ni John Fru Ndi. The later blamed his defeat on electoral rigging, an accusation which was once more directed at the single party in 1997 when the CPDM won the parliamentary elections with 116 out of 180 seats. Therefore, the opposition launched its claim for the creation of an independent electoral body cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de • , -to manage the elections in Cameroon for the sake of transparency. The boycot by the SDF and the CDU of the 1997 presidential elections was precisely based upon the refusal of the government to put in place such a body that was in existence in countries like Benin. The government's refusal was on the grounds that it did not want imported models. But in the end it yielded to mounting pressures, but in puting in place the body in question, it again made sure that it would not work against the ruling party.
In 2000, parliament voted the bill creating a body in charge of supervising elections in Cameroon, i.e. the National Elections Observatory, beter known by its French acronym, ONEL. The later was imported from Senegal where it had been created in 1997. How is it that those who opposed imported models should suddenly import one? The answer can only be found in the intention of the rulers to legislate in favour of the continued dominance of the ruling party. If the government did import a model, it was supposed to harmless to the ruling party.
That then, can only be understood in the light of the context in which the ONEL was presented by Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem (2000) . In Senegal, the ONEL was accepted by Abdou Diouf and his political party only as a means of pre-empting the creation of the independent body that was claimed by the opposition. The independent body called for was to take care of the whole electoral process from the registration on electoral rolls to the proclamation of the results. It seemed to be disadvantageous to the ruling party to refuse such a model. As the opposition insisted, the government inally yielded to demands by appointing a commitee made up of independent personalities and experts that was in charge of presiding over discussions grouping all the political parties of Senegal. It is on the basis of the work done by this commitee that "bdou Diouf created ONEL, the role of which was merely to supervise and control elections, as ONEL had no efective power. Surprisingly, thanks to the commitment of its members to democracy and neutrality, ONEL eventually produced spectacular results, and decisively contributed to the 2000 alternation in Senegal.
The Cameroonian ONEL was also divested of power, and only meant to supervise and control elections. But ONEL in Cameroon was not created on the basis of discussions between political parties: it was a single-handed creation of the government with the blessings of the CPDM dominated parliament. The Cameroonian ONEL members could not be credited with impartiality. Its irst president, Enoch Kwayeb, was a CPDM member. What could one expect as far as political neutrality was concerned from such a president? As ONEL had no credit and the opposition still claimed a real independent body, the government, still under pressure, opted for the creation of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM . The drat bill for ELECAM gave the impression that it was a really independent body as it has the task of organising, managing and supervising the whole electoral process in Cameroon. But as elections approached in Cameroon, the government laid down in article 42 of the drat that before the creating ONEL, the administration would continue to organise elections. The clause was understood as a procrastinating measure illustrating the will of the government not to accept an independent body for the management of elections. Since the CPDM enjoyed the majority in the parliament, nothing could counter the voting of the bill. Facing the protestation of the opposition that staged a walk out, the government changed the clause by allowing a period of 18 months for the establishment of ELECAM. As elections had been convened for July 22, 2007, the administration would again work in favour of the ruling party, illustrating the workings of the 'advanced democracy' on the move.
Conclusion
All in all, Cameroon, since independence, has been searching for its own model of democracy. That democracy was to be its own brand and not an imported model. The irst stage was the institution of the ruling democracy . This Cameroonian brand was characterized by the establishment of the single party system designed to assure the domination of a handful of individuals through the sole political party that identiied itself with the state. The one-party system was ater all the general model for "frica. "ut in comparison with "enin and Niger, Cameroon had a particular model of its own. The Cameroonian exception lay in the fact that the system was a de facto one party system as the constitution still provided for multiparty politics, but not a de jure one. In the 1990s, Cameroon was forced into the multiparty system. As the rulers did not want the new system, they instituted the 'advanced democracy' that aimed at insuring the domination of the ruling party which was the former state party. All legislation regarding the political system has adhered to that spirit. In comparison with Benin and Niger, the striking diference lies in the absence of dialogue in Cameroon. Whereas in these countries political change was carried out through dialogue, in Cameroon the government shied away from dialogue, preferring to dictate. That circumstance largely accounts for the absence of alternation at the helm of the state. The 'advanced democracy' that succeeded the 'ruling democracy' model seems to differ litle from the former since it is still based upon the domination of the political scene by a single party. On the face of it, the 'advanced democracy' seems to be equivalent to the multiparty system, but in reality is far from a truly democratic system when assessed on the basis of the criteria for democracy listed by Peter cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de
• , -Wanyande. The prospect for the near future is that ELECAM should constitute a guarantee for freedom, transparency and fairness of elections. Consequently, there can be hope for alternation and for subsequent real dialogue much needed by democracy.
